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Abstract
In this paper I present an overview of the doctrine known as Positive Aesthetics regarding
aesthetic judgements about nature. According to this view, all pristine nature is always
beautiful and, generally, although not necessarily, human intervention tends to introduce
ugliness in nature. One of the strong practical motivations behind this claim is an attempt
to ground our reasons to preserve natural environments in aesthetic reasons.
Positive Aesthetics has been defended within contrary approaches to nature appreci-
ation such as the cognitivists and the anti-cognitivist. Recently, the possibility of real ugli-
ness in nature has been defended; at the same time, it is argued that the presence of ugly
items in nature does not lead necessarily to the idea that they are not aesthetically valu-
able. Hence, natural ugliness can be a reason to preserve nature. In this sense, the denial of
the Positive Aesthetics claim is shown to be compatible with the appeal to aesthetic nega-
tive qualities as a source of reasons for preserving natural environments.
Key words: Positive Aesthetics, cognitivism and anti-cognitivism about aesthetic judg-
ments of natural items, nature’s preservation, real ugliness.
Resumen. Estética Positiva. Tesis y problemas
En este texto presento un panorama de la doctrina conocida como «Estética Positiva» en rela-
ción a los juicios estéticos sobre la naturaleza. Según esta concepción, toda la naturaleza
prístina es bella; además se considera que, en general, aunque no de manera necesaria, la inter-
vención humana tiende a introducir fealdad en la naturaleza. Una de las motivaciones prác-
ticas tras esta afirmación es la de tratar de fundamentar nuestras razones para preservar el
medio ambiente en razones estéticas.
La doctrina de la Estética Positiva ha sido defendida por teorías de la apreciación esté-
tica tan diferentes como las cognitivistas y las anti-cognitivistas. Recientemente, se ha tratado
de defender la posibilidad de que exista fealdad real en la naturaleza; al mismo tiempo, se ha
argumentado que la presencia de elementos feos en la naturaleza no implica necesariamen-
1. This work has been possible thanks to the finantial support of the research Project «Emo-
ción y Valor Moral en el Arte» (FFI2008-00750/FISO) and «Emoción y Valor Moral en
el Arte: teoría y praxis artísticas» 08694/PHCS/08 financiado por la Fundación Séneca-
Agencia de Ciencia y Tecnología de la Región de Murcia en el marco del II PCTRM
2007-2010.
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te que esos objetos carezcan de valor estético. De hecho, de acuerdo con esta aproximación
al problema, la fealdad natural puede ser una razón para preservar la naturaleza. En este sen-
tido, la negación de la tesis de la Estética Positiva es compatible con la apelación a cualida-
des estéticas negativas como una fuente de razones para preservar los espacios naturales.
Palabras clave: Estética Positiva, cognitivismo y anti-cognitivismo sobre los juicios estéti-
cos de los objetos naturales, preservación de la naturaleza, fealdad real.
Summary
The view that all nature untouched by humans is always beautiful, known as
«Positive Aesthetics», has its roots in the XIXth Century American literature.
Writers such as Ralph W. Emerson and Henry D. Thoreau began to portray
nature as a locus for a particular non-instrumental experience, which can only
be narrowly described as aesthetic. The aesthetic contemplation of pristine
nature stimulated a sort of metaphysical reflection about the place of human
beings within nature. Both the perceptual engagement in this experience and
the object that triggered it were considered as something valuable in them-
selves. This idea served also the preservationist purposes that have become
widespread nowadays: If nature is always beautiful we have a prima facie rea-
son to not to alter it or damage it.
The view, later embraced by some naturalists lacked, however, the necessary
philosophical back up for it to be seriously taken. Despite the fact that it found
support among those who reflected upon nature and who exhibited an inter-
est in it that went beyond instrumental considerations, its philosophical weak-
nesses were noticeable enough for it not to be a strong position. First of all, it
encountered sheer evidence in the many examples of natural beings and envi-
ronments that can hardly be considered as beautiful. Secondly, it seemed that
part of the reasons alleged in favour of the main claim were motivations rather
than justifications of it. It is out of a preservationist desire that natural beau-
ty is over-generalized rather than the other way round.
However, and partly linked to a revitalization of the broader area of the
Aesthetics of Nature in the middle sixties, the view gained some new support
from defenders who embraced a more serious philosophical stance. However
disputable, the claim that pristine nature is always beautiful found a stronger
defence, which has grown and improved in the last decades.
Here I would like to present some of the main arguments in favour of this
view as well as some possible criticism against it. Finally, I would like to address
a recent approach, which holds the aesthetic value of nature is compatible with the
acknowledgment that it can at times be ugly. If this is so, the preservationist can
still make a claim even if the thesis that all nature is beautiful does not stand.
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Positive Aesthetics: Some defenders
Although the view is clear in its target, the reasons that have been offered for
its defence range over a rather varied spectrum. Let’s start with what they all have
in common.
Any defender of the Positive Aesthetic claim needs to establish, even
before arguing for its characteristic claim, that nature, despite its lack of
intentionality, can be regarded from an aesthetic point of view. Together
with this claim they normally hold that however the aesthetic experience of
nature is characterized, it should always be such that takes nature as nature,
and not as something else. This might seem obvious to some; but given a
certain view of aesthetic value it may be less easy to establish. According to
this view, for an object to possess aesthetic value it has to have been done
intentionally so that its form —upon which its aesthetic value depends—
can be specified in a certain way. Where no intention has moulded or shaped
anything in a particular object, it becomes difficult to tell what exactly to
look at or what might be of aesthetic relevance. Thus, a defender of positive
aesthetics needs, in the first place, to make room for an aesthetic experience
of non-intentional objects, and, secondly, to show that the way this is imple-
mented does not merely results from the projection of artistic standards upon
our experience of nature.
The first point easily obtains within a broader view of aesthetic inter-
est, such as Kant’s who did not circumscribed aesthetic experience to art at
all. The second is slightly difficult for, even if aesthetic judgements of nature
may be consciously made in order to avoid that sort of projection, it is much
more difficult to dispel all sorts of influences when it comes to judge a par-
ticular object. Our aesthetic approach to nature cannot be but partly con-
stituted by our artistic sensibility. Specially where the categories used to
describe these experiences belong both to art experience and to the aesthetic
experience of nature it becomes difficult to draw a sharp line between the
two. This might be so, however, in such a way that the charge of projec-
tionism is misplaced or overrated. That some categories may be applied
across different realms does not involve our aesthetic appreciation of nature
is just the result of projecting artistic terms onto it. We may have a view
about our aesthetic concepts such that they become richer as we apply them
to several realms where the notion of aesthetic experience may be appro-
priate.
Once the legitimacy of an aesthetic approach to nature is established dif-
ferences began to arise among those who defend the view that pristine nature
is always beautiful. We will group these differences according to the sort of
reasons considered as valid for this claim.
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The cognitive approach
One of the seemingly more persuasive arguments for the Positive Aesthetic
view is forged within the cognitive approach defended, among others, by Allen
Carlson2.
Carlson has defended the view that a proper aesthetic approach to nature
should satisfy a cognitive requirement. As well as we need to take into account
the category under which a particular artwork belongs to to properly grasp its
aesthetic value, we need to correctly categorize the natural object aesthetical-
ly contemplated if we are to capture its aesthetic qualities rightly. According
to Carlson, the relevant categories when it comes to the aesthetic appreciation
of nature are those provided by science. Only when we rightly place an object
under its scientific outlook can we aspire to grasp its aesthetic value. As he
puts it: «in the case of the natural environment the relevant knowledge is the
common sense/scientific knowledge that we have discovered about the envi-
ronment in question. This knowledge gives us the appropriate foci of aesthetic
significance and the appropriate boundaries of the setting so that our experi-
ence becomes one of aesthetic appreciation»3
This cognitive claim does not directly imply that all nature is beautiful but
it seems to fit a familiar case, which renders the view more persuasive. In par-
ticular, it seems to fit the case in which our aesthetic evaluation of a particular
plant or animal becomes positive once we know more about it from a scientific
point of view. If we generalize this case, a defender of the Positive Aesthetic
view could say that when we find ugliness in nature it is normally due to the
fact that we have misplaced the item; and, consequently, a proper categoriza-
tion will render beautiful what seemed ugly in the first place. Very often, we find
ourselves finding beautiful animals, which at first were judged as ugly; nor-
mally, this change goes hand in hand with a better understanding of the ani-
mal we are judging.
Nevertheless, and despite the persuasive tone of this line, cognitivism is not
enough to grant all nature is beautiful. First, there might be cases where a cor-
rect categorization does not make ugliness to disappear. It does not matter how
much knowledge we have about them, they do not just become prettier. Hold-
ing the opposite is just a stubborn way to confuse cognitive appreciation with
aesthetic one4. Secondly, there might be cases where it is precisely the adequate
knowledge that will render the item ugly. We have also typically encounter pic-
2. CARLSON, Allen (1984). «Nature and Positive Aesthetics». Environmental Ethics, 6,
p. 5-34.
3. CARLSON, Allen (2004). «Appreciation and the Natural Environment». In: CARLSON, Allen;
BERLEANT, Arnold (eds.). The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Toronto: Broadview Press,
p. 71-72.
4. Malcolm Budd has offered a version of this criticism in his BUDD, M. (2002). The Aes-
thetic Appreciation of Nature. Essays on the Aesthetics of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. In
fact, he has defended that there are no substancial reasons to prefer a particular conceptual
framework rather than another —or none— at all when it comes to aesthetically appreciate
nature.
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tures we are not sure what they are about and that may be judged as depicting
something beautiful but that become ugly once we know what they really repre-
sent. Thus, an image of a scar or a wound may sometimes look beautiful if we
do not know the picture’s content; but if we come to know what it is repre-
sented we may judge it as repulsive or ugly. Finally, there are cases where the
aesthetic judgement seems correct despite the fact that we possess wrong infor-
mation about the item judged. A typical example to illustrate this case is when
we judge a whale to be impressive but we believe it to be a fish5. It is very like-
ly that we will judge it similarly had we known it is a mammal, so if there are
cases where a category mistake still produces right aesthetic judgements, aes-
thetic cognitivism seems unnecessary. These problems show cognitivism is not
necessary, nor sufficient to grant the Positive Aesthetics’ main claim.
A way to amend the cognitivist view is to preserve the intuition that a proper
evaluation of a natural item requires the correct categorization but promoting
a wider understanding of the category framework that has to be taken into
consideration. Instead of exclusively accepting scientific theories as the right
category framework, one could argue categories other than scientific could play
the fixing role. Along these lines we can place efforts such as Yuriko Saito6 or Noël
Carroll’s7. According to Saito’s view, it is too restrictive to assume that only sci-
entific categories can properly aesthetically frame the item judged. Our very
relationship with nature goes beyond any scientific approach and, therefore,
other category sets can play a legitimate role in fixing what aspects of the item
are to be considered in order to determine the aesthetic focus. She particularly
points out frameworks deriving from mythological perspectives and folklore.
The important point, in her view, is to keep in mind that we should treat nature
as what it is, i.e., not art. But once this requirement is meet, several ways of
categorizing nature can take part of our aesthetic appreciation. Nevertheless, it
is still doubtful that beauty will always result from this enlarged framework.
Against this hope we may pose a similar worry to the one offered against Carl-
son. Hence, no matter how acutely or richly we describe a natural item there
is always the possibility that its ugliness do not just disappear.
Another attempt to rescue the cognitive approach has been provided by
Glenn Parsons8. He also believes right appreciation requires correct description
but he thinks this cannot by itself provide the necessary support to the Positive
Aesthetic claim. What is needed, in his view, is an amendment of the structure
of cognitivism. He thinks one of the criteria to decide among several scientific
theories has to be precisely an aesthetic one. He notices we usually hold a naïf
5. This example has been offered by Noël Carroll in his CARROLL, N. (2004). «On Being
Moved by Nature: Between Religious and Natural History». In: CARLSON, Allen; BERLEANT,
Arnold (eds.) Op. cit., p. 89-107.
6. SAITO, Yuriko (2004). «Appreciating Nature on its own terms». In: CARLSON, Allen;
BERLEANT, Arnold (eds.). Op. cit., p. 141-155.
7. See reference on note 4.
8. PARSONS, Glenn (2002). «Nature Appreciation, Science, and Positive Aesthetics». British
Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 42, n. 3, July, p. 279-295.
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scientific view that may conflict with a more sophisticated understanding of
the items we judged. When this is the case, we should choose the category that
maximizes the aesthetic value of what we judge. This will grant that in those
cases where some of our categories seem to support a judgement of ugliness
but others present it under a more benevolent light, we choose the later given
that they maximize the overall aesthetic worth of the particular item. A prima
facie worry with this view is that it seems to be badly circular. If the Positive
Aesthetics view is to find some support in our judging practices, it seems odd
to recommend we always choose those categories that will maximize the aes-
thetic value. If two categories generate conflicting aesthetic experiences, it seems
arbitrary that we choose one over the other just in virtue of the maximization
of aesthetic value, especially when that is precisely the point at stake.
Frank Sibley9 has also approached the issue of aesthetic judgements of
nature and, although he has not endorsed cognitivism properly speaking he
has offered some support to the idea that natural items cannot be ugly unless
i) they are seen under a given category and ii) they are a deformed token
within that category. For him, species as such cannot be said ugly. Only
members of a species can be so, if they are deformed tokens of it. It follows
9. SIBLEY, Frank (2000). «Some Notes on Ugliness». In: SIBLEY, F.; BENSON, J.; ROXBEE COX, J.;
REDFERN, H. (eds.). Approach to Aesthetics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
20 Enrahonar 45, 2010 María José Alcaraz León
from his view that categories where it does not make sense to talk of defor-
mity cannot have or contain ugly tokens either. Thus, Sibley points out that
pebbles or clouds, for example, can never be ugly. Although Sibley is not
directly endorsing the view that proper aesthetic appreciation requires cor-
rect categorization, he assumes ugliness is uniquely caused by deformity and
that there cannot be predicative uses of ugliness. These two claims may be
challenged. The first is easily defeated by cases where the judgement of ugli-
ness is not based upon a perceived deformity but rather upon some other
feature. The second is similarly challenged once we come to see some species
are, by themselves, ugly. Thus, a typical example appealed to in order to
challenge Sibley’s point is the aye-aye from Madagascar or the star-nose mole.
In favour of Sibley, however, it can be said that he seems right in pointing
that some things, like pebbles or clouds, can be hardly found ugly; whether
this confirms his claim that natural ugliness is always a matter of deformity
seems still disputable.
Non-cognitivist defence of Positive Aesthetics
It seems that despite the effort to bring nature home by making it more familiar
through knowledge or categorizations, there are still stubborn cases of ugliness
that render these efforts useless.
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In fact some authors has seen them not only as unfruitful but also as mis-
guided. Approaching nature as nature should involve precisely the abandon
of any attempt to categorize it. Nature is essentially unknowable. In spite of
all the categories we choose in order to make it more comprehensible, we will
never be able to grasp it. Besides, those attempts cannot be anything but pro-
jections of our particular human perspective; and projections are not trust-
worthy.
Stan Godlovitch10 has strongly defended this view and has promoted an
approach to nature, which barely allows enjoying two sorts of feelings: awe
and admiration. According to his view, the main principle that should be
respected is that of treating nature as nature and not as something else or as
art. He then defends the view that the most comprehensive attitude towards
nature should take the form of an a-centric perspective —one in which our
own position as human beings is of no significance. Only within an a-centric
perspective can we take equally into account every natural aspect. Discrimi-
nation or relativization are not worries to be had if we follow this principle
10. GODLOVITCH, Stan (1984). «Nature and Positive Aesthetics». Environmental Ethics, 6,
p. 5-34. GODLOVITCH, S. (1998). «Evaluating Nature Aesthetically». Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism, 56, p. 113-125. GODLOVITCH, S. (1998) «Valuing Nature and the Autonomy
of Natural Aesthetics». British Journal of Aesthetics, 38, p. 180-197.
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for it precisely erases any point of view from which one can start ordering what
it is intrinsically lacking order. Nothing more remote to cognitivism can be
stated and, in fact, Godlovitch offers his own view as an antagonist to the one
offered above.
Among the several problems that can be posed against this view, it is remark-
able its naïf depiction of the allegedly exclusively possible respectful relation-
ship towards nature as one where human presence is almost erased. If aesthetic
appreciation is typically spreading from human faculties, it makes little sense
to elaborate a notion of aesthetic stance that builds itself independently of sen-
sitive beings. It is a trivial truth that had we had a different sensibility our aes-
thetic experience would have been different. This, however, is far from show-
ing there is a possible non-relative aesthetics as opposed to a human-relative
one. Our respect towards nature may go beyond our aesthetic outlook, but it
seems rather unavoidable to make reference to human sensibility if we are to
talk about aesthetics at all. Something positive may be kept from this view,
though. In remarking the possibility of a different aesthetic sensibility one can
construe an argument for preservation that goes beyond what we actually value
aesthetically. Maybe, given our sensibilities there are aspects of nature we are
deaf or blind to. However, these aspects may become aesthetically relevant for
us in the future or for other sensitive beings with a different aesthetic outlook.
Another worry with this view is that it barely counts as a defence of the
Positive Aesthetic view for it does not establish all nature is beautiful. Rather
it presents it such that our aesthetic terms will fall sort of grasping it. What
seems to follow from Godlovitch’s approach is that the best attitude we may
aspire to is one of silent respect and awe.
Some alternatives to Positive Aesthetics
As I have pointed out above one of the motivations for the Positive Aesthetic
claim is the preservation of nature. In this sense, it was thought that nature’s
beauty could provide a good reason not to destroy it. However, it has recent-
ly been argued11 that we may keep our preservational motivations while
acknowledging nature is sometimes ugly. In short, ugliness can be an aesthet-
ic value worth preserving and its recognition will make us more accurate both
philosophical and empirically speaking. Emily Brady has put this view for-
ward. She has discussed the validity of the Positive Aesthetics claim as well as
proposed a positive view of natural ugliness.
As she has, I think rightly, pointed out, most of the arguments in favour
of the Positive Aesthetic view fails. This, together with wide empirical evi-
dence, speaks in favour of acknowledging natural ugliness is as widespread as
natural beauty. In fact, the denial of natural ugliness seems to spread from
a mystification of nature, to say the least. Once this is admitted, a defender of a
preservationist policy may find herself in a odd situation if she hoped to ground
11. BRADY, Emily (2010). «Ugliness and Nature», published in this same issue.
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it upon aesthetics concerns. Given that ugliness is a negative aesthetic value, we
seem to be deprived of an aesthetic reason to preserve those items that we judge
to be ugly. How can one then reconcile a preservationist policy with the recog-
nition of ugliness in nature?
As Brady has pointed out, no strategy that turns ugliness into some sort
of difficult beauty will work. The point is not to turn ugliness into beauty but
to recognize that natural ugliness may be valuable for us. Certainly it seems
more difficult to show something with negative —aesthetic or of any other
kind— value may be valuable in virtue of it. Normally, cases in which some-
thing becomes valued due to its negative value are cases in which the negative
value is considered as unavoidable in order to get a higher goal. Thus pain
may be necessary in order to achieve a certain state but that does not mean
we value pain as such, only instrumentally speaking.
However, it seems this is not a good strategy either. We aim at showing
not that ugliness may be sometimes the price paid to get a more rewarding
aesthetic experience, but that it is worth it in itself. Brady’s strategy has been to
draw a parallel between tragedy and nature. As well as tragedy is valuable pre-
cisely in virtue of arousing negative feelings in the audience, ugliness in nature
may be equally justifiably valuable. However, does the analogy work? It seems
more or less accepted that the cognitive and moral benefit of tragedy is inti-
mately linked to the sort of negative experience it arouses in the audience. In
fact, it is claimed it is intrinsic to the cognitive gain that it is achieved through
that particular experience. Now, while it seems obvious that in the case of
tragedy the negative experience finds a sort of internal cognitive justification
and that, hence, its value cannot be detached from it, it seems more difficult
to describe the negative value of natural ugliness in these terms. For what is
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the cognitive payoff —or any other sort of gain-that natural ugliness may offer
to us in order to justify its value? Can we find a counterpart in the case of nat-
ural ugliness for the painful experience that we typically value in tragedy?
A possible answer could be that we will not enjoy natural beauty as much
if it was not for the alternative presence of natural ugliness. Maybe, when it
comes to aesthetics, contrasts are more important than it may appear. Thus, a
natural world with no ugliness whatsoever could be overall considered as less
aesthetically interesting as one where we find instances of both values.
Another response can be articulated by appealing to a complex under-
standing of our aesthetic responses to nature. This would require, in turn, a
complex view about aesthetic experience in general and the extent to which
they not only manifest our sensibility but also features of our relationship to the
world as a whole. According to this view aesthetic engagement is not simply a
matter of responding with pleasure or displeasure to patterns or forms. It also
manifests a deeper engagement of other faculties, which, although not in the
forefront, determine some aspects of our aesthetic responses. Within this under-
standing of aesthetic sensibility, the experience of ugliness in nature will be
valuable as such in so far as it will be a necessary component of our overall
aesthetic outlook. Without it nature will not be as aesthetically and cognitively
interesting as with it.
I have tried to briefly summarize some of the main positions that have con-
sidered the claim of Positive Aesthetics as well as some of the problems they
seem to face. The connection between positive aesthetic value and preserva-
tion has been brought, I think, beyond the limits of what seems rational and
empirically sensible. If one sides preservationist policies one does not need to
deny nature can be ugly. We can try to show that ugliness may still have a place
within a view that take our aesthetic relationship with nature as enough com-
plex to be improved by the presence of negative aesthetic features.12
12. La reproducción de textos e imágenes en este artículo se acoge al texto refundido de la Ley
de Propiedad Intelectual, en cuyo artículo 32 del Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de 12 de
abril (BOE número 97, de 22 de abril) con las modificaciones dadas al mismo por la Ley
5/1998 de 6 de marzo (BOE número 57, de 7 de marzo) y la Ley 1/2000 de 7 de enero
(BOE número 7 de 8 de enero), se dice lo siguiente: «Es lícita la inclusión en una obra pro-
pia de fragmentos de otras obras ajenas de naturaleza escrita, sonora o audiovisual, así como
la de obras aisladas de carácter plástico, fotográfico, figurativo o análogo, siempre que se
trate de obras ya divulgadas y su inclusión se realice a título de cita o para su análisis, comen-
tario o juicio crítico. Tal utilización sólo podrá realizarse con fines docentes o de investi-
gación, en la medida justificada por el fin de esa incorporación e indicando la fuente y el nom-
bre del autor de la obra utilizada».
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